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ABSTRACT 
Network forensics deals with the capture, recording and analysis of network events in order to discover 
evidential information about the source of security attacks in a court of law. This paper discusses the 
different tools and techniques available to conduct network forensics. Some of the tools discussed 
include: eMailTrackerPro – to identify the physical location of an email sender; Web Historian – to find  
the duration of each visit and the files uploaded and downloaded from the visited website; packet sniffers 
like Ethereal – to capture and analyze the data exchanged among the different computers in the network. 
The second half of the paper presents a survey of different IP traceback techniques like packet marking 
that help a forensic investigator to identify the true sources of the attacking IP packets. We also discuss 
the use of Honeypots and Honeynets that gather intelligence about the enemy and the tools and tactics of 
network intruders. 
KEYWORDS 
Network Forensics, IP Traceback, Honeypots, Packet Sniffers, Legal Aspects   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Internet usage has increased drastically in the past ten years. Recent studies reveal that today in 
the United States for every three people, one would be using the Internet for their personal 
activity, or for their business needs [1]. As the number of people using the Internet increases, 
the number of illegal activities such as data theft, identity theft, etc also increases exponentially. 
Computer Forensics deals with the collection and analysis of data from computer systems, 
networks, communication streams (wired and wireless) and storage media in a manner 
admissible in a court of law [2]. Network forensics deals with the capture, recording or analysis 
of network events in order to discover evidential information about the source of security 
attacks in a court of law [3]. With the rapid growth and use of Internet, network forensics has 
become an integral part of computer forensics. This paper surveys the tools and techniques 
(efficient, easy to use and cost effective) available to conduct network forensics.  
Section 2 explains how to conduct “Email Forensics” using certain freely available tools such as 
EmailTrackerPro [4] and SmartWhoIs [5]. Spam emails are a major source of concern within 
the Internet community. The tools described in this Section could be used to trace the sender of 
an email. Section 3 describes how to conduct “Web Forensics” using freely available tools like 
Web Historian [6] and Index.dat analyzer [7]. These tools help to reveal the browsing history of 
a person including the number of times a website has been visited in the past and the duration of 
each visit, the files that have been uploaded and downloaded from the visited website, the 
cookies setup as part of the visits and other critical information. Section 4 describes the use of 
packet sniffers like Ethereal [8] to explore the hidden information in the different headers of the 
TCP/IP protocol stack. These sniffers capture the packets exchanged in the Ethernet and allow 
the investigator to collect critical information from the packets. 
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The second half of the paper presents a survey on the different techniques proposed for network 
forensics in research articles. Section 5 describes the use of IP traceback techniques to reliably 
determine the origin of a packet in the Internet, i.e., to help the forensic investigator to identify 
the true sources of the attacking IP packets [9]. The IP traceback techniques allow a victim to 
identify the network paths traversed by the attack traffic without requiring interactive 
operational support from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Section 6 describes the use of 
Honeypots and Honeynets in intrusion detection systems [10, 11]. A Honeypot is a computer in 
a network to which no traffic should come from outside. A network of Honeypots across the 
Internet is called a Honeynet. As no traffic from outside should arrive to a Honeypot, if one 
notices packets arriving to a Honeypot, it is an indication of an attack being launched on the 
network in which the Honeypot is located. This information could be used to counter threats or 
an imminent attack. Section 7 presents the conclusions.  
2. EMAIL FORENSICS 
Email is one of the most common ways people communicate, ranging from internal meeting 
requests, to distribution of documents and general conversation. Emails are now being used for 
all sorts of communication including providing confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation 
and data integrity. As email usage increases, attackers and hackers began to use emails for 
malicious activities. Spam emails are a major source of concern within the Internet community. 
Emails are more vulnerable to be intercepted and might be used by hackers to learn of secret 
communication. Email forensics refers to studying the source and content of electronic mail as 
evidence, identifying the actual sender and recipient of a message, date/time it was sent and etc. 
Emails frequently contain malicious viruses, threats and scams that can result in the loss of data, 
confidential information and even identity theft. The tools described in this section provide an 
easy-to-use browser format, automated reporting and easy tool bar access features. The tools 
help to identify the point of origin of the message, trace the path traversed by the message (used 
to identify the spammers) and also to identify the phishing emails that try to obtain confidential 
information from the receiver. 
eMailTrackerPro [4] analyzes the header of an email to detect the IP address of the machine 
that sent the message so that the sender can be tracked down. All email messages contain a 
header, located at the top of the email. The header contains the source of an email in the “From” 
line, while in the “Received” lines, the header lists every point the email passed through on its 
journey, along with the date and time. The message header provides an audit trail of every 
machine the email has passed through. The built-in location database in eMailTrackerPro helps 
to track emails to a country or region of the world, showing information on a global map. To 
trace an email message, one has to just copy and paste the header of the email in 
eMailTrackerPro and start the tool. A basic trace will be shown on the main Graphical User 
Interface and a summary report can be obtained. The summary report provides an option to 
report the abuse of the particular email address to the administrators of the sender and/or victim 
networks and also contains some critical information that can be useful for forensic analysis and 
investigation. The report includes the geographic location of the IP address from which the 
email was sent, and if this cannot be found, the report at least includes the location of the 
target’s ISP. The report also includes the domain contact information of the network owner or 
the ISP, depending on the sender email address. The domain registration details provide 
information such as who has registered the website address, from what time and how many 
emails have been sent from that address, and etc.  
SmartWhoIs [5] is a freeware network utility to look up all the available information about an IP 
address, hostname or domain, including country, state or province, city, name of the network 
provider, administrator and technical support contact information. Sometimes, one has to use 
SmartWhoIs along with eMailTrackerPro if the information provided by the latter is not 
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complete. Once installed on a machine, a SmartWhoIs button will be added to the Internet 
Explorer (IE) toolbar. Using this handy button, one can invoke SmartWhoIs anytime one wants 
to get more information about the website currently being visited. Using SmartWhoIs, one can 
also query about multiple IP addresses, hostnames or domains at a time.         
3. WEB FORENSICS 
The predominant web browsers in use today are Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) and the 
Firefox/ Mozilla/ Netscape family. Each of these browsers saves, in their own unique formats, 
the web browsing activity (also known as web browsing history) of the different users who have 
accounts on a machine. IE stores the browsing history of a user in the index.dat file and the 
Firefox/ Mozilla/ Netscape family browsers save the web activity in a file named history.dat. 
These two files are hidden files. So, in order to view them, the browser should be setup to show 
both hidden files and system files. One cannot easily delete these two files in any regular way. 
There is also no proof that deleting these files has sped up the browsing experience of the users. 
Web forensics deals with gathering critical information related to a crime by exploring the 
browsing history of a person, the number of times a website has been visited, the duration of 
each visit, the files that have been uploaded and downloaded from the visited website, the 
cookies setup as part of the visit and other critical information.   
Mandiant Web Historian [6] assists users in reviewing web site URLs that are stored in the 
history files of the most commonly used web browsers. The tool allows the forensic examiner to 
determine what, when, where, and how the intruders looked into the different sites. Web 
Historian can be used to parse a specific history file or recursively search through a given folder 
or drive and find all the browser history files that the tool knows how to parse. Web Historian 
generates a single report (that can be saved in different file formats) containing the Internet 
activity from all of the browser history files it is able to locate.  
The Index.dat analyzer [7] is a forensic tool to view, examine and delete the contents of 
index.dat files. The tool can be used to simultaneously or individually view the browsing 
history, the cookies and the cache. The tool provides support to directly visit the website listed 
in the output of the analyzer and also to open the file uploaded to or downloaded from the 
website. The tool also provides critical information about a cookie like its key-value pair, the 
website address associated with the cookie, the date/time the cookie was first created and last 
accessed and etc. In addition to these two tools, there exist tools like Total Recall [12], which 
can be used to extract the list of favourite websites stored in the browser history. 
4. PACKET SNIFFERS 
A sniffer is software that collects traffic flowing into and out of a computer attached to a 
network [13]. Network engineers, system administrators and security professionals use sniffers 
to monitor and collect information about different communications occurring over a network. 
Sniffers are used as the main source for data collection in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to 
match packets against a rule-set designed to notify anything malicious or strange. Law 
enforcement agencies use sniffers to gather specific traffic in a network and use the data for 
investigative analysis. 
4.1 Ethereal 
Ethereal is an open source software and widely used as a network packet analyzer. It captures 
packets live from the network. It displays the information in the headers of all the protocols 
used in the transmission of the packets captured. It filters the packets depending on user needs. 
Ethereal allows search for packets with some specifications. It gives better representation to 
understand the results easily by using a colorized display of packets belonging to different 
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protocols. The platforms supported by Ethereal include Microsoft Windows, UNIX and Linux. 
Ethereal provides an option to select the interface across which one wants to capture the 
packets. Ethereal can also be run in promiscuous mode to capture packets that are not addressed 
to the machine running Ethereal. While packet capture is under progress, Ethereal shows the 
kind of packets captured along with their protocols like Transport Control Protocol (TCP), User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and etc. When the capturing 
process is done, it displays the packet list with all the detailed information (refer Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of Packet List Displayed by Ethereal 
 
The output obtained from Ethereal is organized in three panes: Packet List pane, Packet Details 
pane and Packet Bytes pane. The Packet List pane displays all the packets in the current capture 
file. Each line in this list corresponds to a packet in the capture file. When one selects a 
particular line in this list, more details will be listed in the “Packet Details” and “Packet Bytes” 
panes. The Packet List pane displays high-level details of the packets in several columns. 
Though, there are a lot of different columns available, the default columns are as follows: (i) 
No: The number of the packet in the capture file; (ii) Time: The timestamp of the packet; (iii) 
Source: The IP address of the sender of the packet; (iv) Destination: The IP address of the 
system to which the packet is destined to go and (v) Protocol: The high-level protocol name in a 
short abbreviated form. 
The Packet Details pane shows the structure of the different headers (starting from the frame-
level) of the packet selected in the Packet List pane. Each header can be expanded and 
collapsed. When one selects a particular header in the Packet Details pane, the byte-level 
content of the header is displayed in the Packet Bytes pane in a Hexdump style. Generally in 
Hexdump, the left side shows the offset in the packet data, in the middle the packet data is 
shown and on the right side, the corresponding ASCII characters are displayed. 
 
Ethereal provides options to save the capture file, export the results and also to search for 
packets based on a specific field or value in the current capture file or a saved capture file. 
Another useful option provided by Ethereal is packet colorization. One can setup the packet 
colors according to a filter. This helps to easily identify and explore the packets one is usually 
interested in. 
4.2 WinPcap and AirPcap 
WinPcap [14] is the packet capture tool used to capture the packets intercepted at the network 
interface of a system running the Windows Operating System. WinPcap is the tool used for 
link-layer network access in Windows. WinPcap includes a network statistics engine and 
provides support for kernel-level packet filtering and remote packet capture.  
AirPcap [15] is the packet capture tool for the IEEE 802.11b/g Wireless LAN interfaces. This 
tool is currently available only for Windows systems. AirPcap can be used to capture the 
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control frames (ACK, RTS, CTS), management frames (Beacon, Probe Requests and 
Responses, Authentication) and data frames of the 802.11 traffic. The AirPcap adapter captures 
the per-packet power information, which can be used to detect weak signal areas and measure 
the transmission efficiency of the wireless devices. 
5. IP TRACEBACK TECHNIQUES 
Masquerade attacks [9] can be produced by spoofing at the link-layer (e.g., using a different 
MAC address than the original), at the Internet layer (e.g., using a different source IP address 
than the original), at the transport layer (e.g., using a different TCP/IP port than the original 
one), at the application layer (e.g., using a different email address than the original). Let C = h1 
Æ h2 Æ … Æ hi Æ hi+1Æ … Æ hn be the connection path between hosts h1 to hn. Then, the IP 
traceback problem is defined as: Given the IP address hn, identify the actual IP addresses of 
hosts h n-1, …, h1. If h1 is the source and hn is the victim machine of a security attack, then C is 
called the attack path [9].  
Reconstruction of the attack path back to the originating attacker h1 may not be a 
straightforward process because of possible spoofing at different layers of the TCP/IP protocol 
stack and also the intermediate hosts becoming compromised hosts, called stepping-stone, and 
acting as a conduit for the attacker’s communication. The security functions practiced in 
existing networks may also preclude the capability to follow the reverse path. For example, if 
the attacker lies behind a firewall, then most of the traceback packets are filtered at the firewall 
and one may not be able to exactly reach the attacker. The link testing techniques start the 
traceback from the router closest to the victim and interactively determine the upstream link that 
was used to carry the attack traffic. The technique is then recursively applied on the upstream 
routers until the source is reached. Link testing assumes the attack is in progress and cannot be 
used “post-mortem”. There are two varieties of link testing techniques: input debugging and 
controlled flooding. 
5.1 Input Debugging 
After recognizing that it is being attacked, the victim develops an attack signature that describes 
a common feature contained in all the attack packets. The victim communicates this attack 
signature to the upstream router that sends it the attack packets. Based on this signature, the 
upstream router employs filters that prevent the attack packets from being forwarded through an 
egress port and determines which ingress port they arrived on. The process is then repeated 
recursively on the upstream routers, until the originating site is reached or the trace leaves the 
boundary of the network provider or the Internet Service Provider (ISP). From now on, the 
upstream ISP has to be contacted to repeat the procedure. The most obvious problem with the 
input debugging approach, even with the automated tools, is the considerable management 
overhead at the ISP level to communicate and coordinate the traceback across domains. 
5.2 Controlled Flooding 
The victim uses a pre-generated map of the Internet topology to iteratively select hosts that 
could be coerced to flood each of the incoming links of the upstream router. Since the router 
buffer is shared by packets coming across all incoming links, it is possible that the attack 
packets have a higher probability of being dropped due to this flooding. By observing changes 
in the rate of packets received from the attacker, the victim infers the link through which the 
attack packet would have come to the upstream router. This basic testing procedure is then 
recursively applied on all the upstream routers until the source is reached. Though this method 
is both ingenious and pragmatic, using unsuspecting hosts to flood is itself a denial-of-service 
attack. It would be a tremendous overhead to use flooding to detect distributed denial-of-service 
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attacks when multiple upstream links may be contributing to the attack. The victim also needs to 
possess an accurate topology map to select the hosts that would flood the upstream routers.  
5.3 ICMP Traceback 
In [16], Bellovin proposed the iTrace scheme, which is currently one of the IETF standards. 
According to iTrace, every router will sample, with a low probability (like 0.00005), one of the 
packets it is forwarding and copy the contents into an ICMP traceback message, which will 
have information about adjacent routers and the message will be sent to the destination. This 
technique is more likely to be applicable for attacks that originate from a few sources and are of 
flooding-style attacks so that the receiver gets enough packets to reconstruct the attack path. To 
handle the situation of attackers sending their own ICMP traceback messages to mislead the 
destination, the iTrace scheme uses HMAC [17] and supports the use of X.509 Digital 
Certificates [18] for authenticating and evaluating ICMP traceback messages. A couple of 
potential drawbacks for this scheme are that: (1) ICMP traffic is increasingly getting filtered 
compared to normal traffic and (2) If certain routers in the attack path are not enabled with 
iTrace, the destination would have to reconstruct several possible attack paths that have a 
sequence of participating routers, followed by one or more non-participating routers and 
followed by a sequence of participating routers and so on. 
5.4 Packet Marking Techniques 
The idea behind the packet marking techniques is to sample the path one node at a time rather 
than recording the entire path. A “node” field, large enough to hold a single router address, in 
the packet header is reserved. For IPv4, this would be a 32-bit field in the Options portion of the 
IP header. Upon receiving a packet, a router chooses to write its own address in the node field 
with a probability p. Given that enough packets could be sent and the route remains stable, the 
victim would receive at least one sample for every router in the attack path.  
Since the routers are ordered serially, the probability that a packet will be marked by a router 
and not marked by the downstream routers is a strictly decreasing function of the distance to the 
victim. Assuming the probability of marking p is the same for every router, the probability of 
receiving a packet marked from a router d hops away and not marked by any other router since 
then is p(1-p)d-1. Figure 2 illustrates the probability of receiving a packet marked from a router 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 hops away and not marked by any other router on a 6-hop path for different 
values of the individual probability of marking p.   
        
Figure 2. Probability of Marking by a Router        Figure 3. Threshold Probability of Marking 
           Vs Hop Count of Attack Path                                 Vs Hop Count of Attack Path 
 
The threshold probability of marking is defined as the minimum probability value to be 
assigned to every router on a path in order to guarantee with 99% probability that at least one 
router on the path will mark a packet. The threshold probability of marking decreases with the 
increase in the number of hops. The larger the number of intermediate routers, the greater is the 
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chance of at least one router in the path deciding to mark the packet. Figure 3 shows the 
threshold probability of marking as the number of hops is varied from 1 to 25.   
The convergence time is defined as the minimum threshold number of packets required to 
determine the sequence of routers that form the attack path. To determine the order of the 
routers in the attack path, each router on the path should have marked different number of times 
on the packets. The router that is closest to the victim will have the highest number of marks 
and the router that is closest to the attacker will have the minimum number of marks. In general, 
to determine an n-hop attack path Attacker Æ Rn Æ Rn-1 Æ … Æ Ri Æ Ri-1 … Æ R2 Æ R1 Æ 
Victim, the following two conditions should be satisfied: (i) the victim should receive packets 
such that every router in the attack path should have marked at least one packet and (ii) the 
number of packets marked by Router Ri should be strictly greater than Ri-1, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ n. The 
convergence time is basically the minimum number of packets the victim needs to receive such 
that the above two conditions are satisfied.  
       
                   Figure 4. Convergence Time                                Figure 5. Convergence Time 
                        for a 3-hop Attack Path                                          for a 6-hop Attack Path 
  
       
                   Figure 6. Convergence Time                                Figure 7. Convergence Time 
                        for a 9-hop Attack Path                                        for a 12-hop Attack Path 
 
     
                    Figure 8. Convergence Time                               Figure 9. Convergence Time 
                        for a 15-hop Attack Path                                      for a 18-hop Attack Path 
The value of the convergence time depends on the probability of marking by a router and the 
hop count of the attack path. Figures 4 through 9 show the convergence time measured for 
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different probability of marking values on attacks paths with different hop counts, measured 
with 95% to 97% confidence intervals. For a given hop count of the attack path, the 
convergence time is minimum for a certain range of values for the probability of marking. The 
value of the threshold marking probability decreases as the hop count of the attack path is 
increased because the probability of any router on the attack path marking the packet increases 
as the hop count increases. Thus, it is possible to reduce the threshold probability of marking a 
packet as the hop count increases. The minimum convergence time also increases as the hop 
count of the attack path increases. This is because as the hop count increases, it takes more time 
for a router closer to the attacker to have a packet marked such that the packet is not marked by 
any downstream router on the attack path. In order to lower the convergence time in larger hop 
count attack paths, it is essential to assign a lower probability of marking for the routers.  
5.5 Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) Architecture 
The Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) architecture [19] implements the log-based IP 
traceback technique to trace the path for a single packet across autonomous systems. In SPIE, 
routers compute a 32-bit digest of the packets based on the 20 byte IP header and the first 8 
bytes of the payload. The routers store these 32-bit packet digests, instead of the packets 
themselves, in a space-efficient data structure called Bloom filter [20].  
Within each autonomous system (AS), SPIE consists of three major architectural components: 
Data Generation Agent (DGA), SPIE collection and reduction agent (SCAR) and SPIE 
Traceback Manager (STM). The DGA is in charge of computing the 32-bit digests and storing 
them in the Bloom filter. The SCAR is responsible for generating the attack path within a region 
of the AS. When requested for an attack path, the SCAR queries the DGAs in the region and 
compiles the attack path based on the replies from the DGAs. The STM controls the whole SPIE 
system in the AS. When the STM receives a request to trace an IP packet, it generates requests 
to the SCARs and then grafts the attack paths returned by the SCARs to form a complete attack 
path through the AS. As illustrated in Figure 10 and explained below, it is possible to trace an 
attack path for a single packet that traversed through a mix of SPIE-deployed and non SPIE-
deployed ASes.    
 
Figure 10. Traceback across Autonomous Systems using SPIE (adapted from [19]) 
  
It is assumed that all SPIE-deployed ASes exchange the SPIE deployment information as an 
attribute in the network route advertisement messages of the Border Gateway Protocol [21]. As 
a result, each SPIE-deployed AS knows about the other SPIE-deployed ASes, the number of 
hops (AS levels) and their respective STMs. In Figure 10, an attack packet is sent from an 
attacker in AS10 to a victim in AS1. When the victim reports about the attack packet to the 
STM in AS1, the STM queries its one-hop STMs in other ASes about the attack path. Note that 
AS1 cannot directly contact AS2 as the latter is not SPIE-deployed. So, the STM in AS1 will 
first query the STM in AS7. Since the attack packet did not traverse through this AS, the STM 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol .1, No.1,April 2009 
 22
in AS7, after an internal traceback, sends a negative reply message to the STM in AS1. The 
STM in AS1 then queries the two-hop STMs in AS3 and AS4. After an internal traceback, these 
two STMs send back positive reply messages that contain the attack path within their AS. The 
two ASes will also let AS1 know who are their one-hop and two-hop SPIE-deployed ASes so 
that AS1 can query the STMs of those ASes. AS3 will let AS1 know that AS10 and AS4 are its 
one-hop SPIE-deployed ASes and that AS5 and AS7 are two-hop SPIE-deployed ASes. The 
STM of AS1 contacts its counterpart in AS10. The STM in AS10 will then conduct an internal 
trace and report back to the STM in AS1 about the attack path that includes the attacker in its 
AS. The STM of AS1 grafts the attack path in AS1 and the attack paths returned from AS3 and 
AS10 to get the entire attack path.  
 
The SPIE approach is scalable in the Internet because of the following two reasons: (i) Each 
STM could be configured with the furthest level of SPIE deployment information to maintain. 
Generally, STMs need to maintain SPIE deployment information only about nearby ASes (like 
one-hop, two-hop ASes). A remote STM will notify the victim STM about the nearby STMs to 
the remote AS and the victim STM can continue querying those STMs as explained before. (ii) 
An STM need not keep track of the status of ongoing traceback processes.  
6. HONEYPOTS AND HONEYNETS 
A Honeynet is a network specifically designed for the purpose of being compromised [11]. A 
compromised Honeynet can be used to observe the activities and behaviour of the intruder. A 
Honeynet allows to conduct a detailed analysis of the tools used by the intruders and to identify 
the vulnerabilities exploited by the intruders to compromise the Honeypots. In general, a 
Honeypot could range from a simple port-listening socket program to a full production system 
that can be emulated under various operating systems. Sometimes, a Honeypot would attract 
traffic by acting as a decoy system, posing itself to the Internet as a legitimate system offering 
services. The essential idea is that any traffic directed to the Honeypot is considered an attack or 
intrusion. Any connection initiated inbound to Honeypot is likely to be a probe, scan or attack. 
Any outbound connection from a Honeypot implies someone has compromised the Honeypot 
and has initiated outbound activity. Hence, forensic analysis of the activities of a Honeypot is 
less likely to lead to false negatives and false positives when compared to the more evasive and 
signature-dependent network intrusion detection systems [22]. Honeypots can help us to detect 
vulnerabilities that are not yet understood or not yet seen before. 
Honeypots can be classified to two types [23] depending on the configured services available 
for an adversary to compromise or probe the system: low-interaction and high-interaction 
Honeypots. A high-interaction Honeypot can be compromised completely, thus allowing an 
adversary to gain access to all aspects of the operating system and launch further network 
attacks. The larger the number of Honeypots deployed, the more likely that one can effectively 
gather information about network attacks or probes. For example, most of the TCP connection 
requests are generated and sent to randomly selected IP addresses. One can identify that the 
connection request is for malicious traffic only after a TCP handshake is over and payload 
containing malicious contents is received. The probability of this happening will be more as the 
number of Honeypots increases. 
A Honeynet normally employs a Honeywall [11], which acts as a firewall to protect the outside 
world from attacks emanating from within the Honeynet. In order to protect non-Honeypot 
systems with attacks originating from a compromised Honeypot, a Honeywall could be setup 
with several data control and data capture features. A Honeywall could limit the number of 
outbound connections allowed per hour. It could limit the bandwidth available to the attacker’s 
traffic. A Honeywall can also on-the-fly modify malicious data packets that specifically target 
vulnerabilities on other systems and make them benign.  
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A Honeywall can capture and monitor all data traffic entering, leaving, or inside the Honeynet. 
The captured data can be used to analyze the steps an attacker took to compromise a Honeypot 
and how a compromised Honeypot is being used further. In order to prevent a Honeywall from 
intercepting the communications, an attacker may sometimes install encryption software to 
encrypt all communications between the attacker’s machine and the Honeypot. In such 
situations, a Honeywall may not be capable of decrypting the communications. To address this 
problem, a logging software called Sebek [10] has been recently developed. Sebek is a software 
tool running on each Honeypot and is part of the machine’s operating system. Sebek merely 
intercepts the data after the attacker’s encryption software decrypts it. The decrypted 
information is sent to a remote server for further analysis. 
6.1 Serial Vs Parallel Architecture 
A Honeynet could be setup based on either a serial architecture (refer Figure 11) or a parallel 
architecture (refer Figure 12) [24]. With a serial architecture, the Honeywall filters all traffic 
forwarded to the firewall of the production system (the network of machines that provide useful 
services) and all traffic in and out of the production system goes through the Honeynet. If a 
Honeynet is compromised, the firewall of the production system is alerted. Even if the attack is 
in progress in the Honeynet, the firewall will make sure the attack does not expand into the 
production system. When sufficient evidence is collected in the Honeynet, one can stop running 
the Honeynet and start analyzing the malicious traffic directed towards it. The advantage of a 
Honeynet with a serial architecture is that it protects the production system from direct 
malicious attacks. The disadvantage would be the delay suffered for every incoming and 
outgoing packet, including the genuine benign ones, at the Honeynet/ firewall.  
                                                     
          Figure 11. Serial Architecture                                Figure 12. Parallel Architecture 
 
With a parallel architecture, both the Honeynet and the production system are exposed directly 
to the Internet so that the delay incurred for every packet at the Honeynet/ firewall could be 
avoided. On the other hand, a blackhat could directly attack the production system and hence 
the firewall at the production system should be configured with stringent packet filtering 
policies to reduce the chances of untoward attacks. If the Honeynet gets some traffic, it analyzes 
that traffic and updates the firewall depending on the nature of the traffic received. The firewall 
will then become more stringent in protecting the production system. 
6.2 Virtual Honeypots 
A physical Honeypot is a real machine with its own IP address. A virtual Honeypot [25] is a 
simulated machine that can be modelled to behave as required. Multiple virtual Honeypots, each 
running the same or different operating systems, can be simulated on a single system. Each of 
these virtual Honeypots can be configured with specific services that will be exploited by the 
attackers to gain access to a Honeypot. As attackers attempt to contact machines with randomly 
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chosen IP addresses, the more the number of virtual Honeypots deployed with the same kind of 
services, the more it helps to capture the connection requests and payload traffic generated by 
the attackers.  
Honeyd [25] is a framework for virtual Honeypots to simulate computer systems at the network 
level. It creates virtual networks consisting of arbitrary routing topologies with configurable link 
characteristics like delay, bandwidth, packet loss and etc. To deceive TCP/IP stack 
fingerprinting tools like Xprobe [26] or Nmap [27] and to convince the adversaries that a virtual 
Honeypot is running a given operating system, Honeyd simulates the TCP/IP stack of the target 
operating system. A virtual Honeypot responds to network requests according to the services 
that are configured in it.  
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The overall contribution of this paper is an exhaustive survey of the several tools and techniques 
available to conduct network forensics. All the tools surveyed in this paper are free to use, at 
least available for trials. The paper explored in detail the different IP traceback mechanisms. 
Simulations were run to find out the convergence time for attack paths with different lengths 
and attack routers with different probabilities of marking. Finally, the paper described the 
Honeynet Architecture and the use of Honeypots, both and physical and virtual, in detecting 
malicious attack traffic and protecting the production systems.  
In general, the security and forensic personnel need to keep up pace with the latest attack tools 
and techniques adopted by the attackers. With freely available tools, one can enforce the 
security mechanisms and analyze attack traffic only to a certain extent. To detect all kinds of 
attacks and conduct a comprehensive forensic analysis, one would have to deploy and analyze 
the effectiveness of commercial tools. This is the plan for future research. Future work would 
also involve exploring the tools and techniques available for wireless network forensics.  
 
REFERENCES 
[1] http://www.time.com 
[2] G. Kessler, “Online Education in Computer and Digital Forensics,” Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, 2007. 
[3] K. Sisaat and D. Miyamoto, “Source Address Validation Support for Network Forensics,” 
Proceedings of the 1st Joint Workshop on Information Security, Sep 2006. 
[4] http://www.emailtrackerpro.com 
[5] http://www.tamos.com 
[6] http://www.mandian.com 
[7] http://www.majorgeeks.com/index.dat_analyzer_d5259.html, last accessed: 04/03/2009 
[8] http://www.ethereal.com 
[9] S. Mitropoulos, D. Pastos and C. Douligers, “Network Forensics: Towards a Classification of 
Traceback Mechanisms,” Proceedings of the Workshop on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas 
in Communication Networks, pp. 9 – 16, Sep 2005. 
[10] Honeynet Project, http://www.honeynets.org 
[11] V. Maheswari and P. Sankaranarayan, “Honeypots: Deployment and Data Forensic Analysis,” 
International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Multi-media Applications, May 2007. 
[12] http://www.janusware.com 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol .1, No.1,April 2009 
 25
[13] S. Ansari, S. Rajeev and H. Chandrasekhar, “Packet Sniffing: A Brief Introduction,” IEEE 
Potentials, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 17 – 19, Dec 2002/Jan 2003. 
[14] http://www.winpcap.org 
[15] http://www.airpcap.co.uk/ 
[16] S. Bellovin, M. Leech and T. Taylor, ICMP Traceback Messages, Internet Draft, February 2003. 
[17] US Department of Commerce, Federal Information Processing Standards, Publication 198, The 
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), March 6 2002. 
[18] C. Adams, Internet X. 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, RFC 2510, 
Available at http://www.ietf.org/ 
[19] T. Korkmaz, C. Gong, K. Sarac and S. Dykes, “Single Packet IP Traceback in AS-level Partial 
Deployment Scenario,” International Journal of Security and Networks, Vol. 2, No. 1/2, pp. 95 – 
108, 2007. 
[20] B. Bloom, “Space/time Trade-offs in Hash Coding with Allowable Errors,” Communications of 
ACM, Vol. 13, No. 7, pp. 422 – 426, July 1970. 
[21] L. L. Peterson and B. Davie, “Computer Networks: A Systems Approach,” 4th Edition, Morgan 
Kaufmann Series in Networking, March 2007.    
[22] V. Paxson, “Bro: A System for Detecting Network Intruders in Real-Time,” Proceedings of the 7th 
USENIX Security Symposium, January 1998. 
[23] R. Stone, “CenterTrack: An IP Overlay Network for Tracking DoS Floods,” Proceedings of the 
USENIX Security Symposium, July 2000. 
[24] Y. Manzano and A. Yasinsac, “Honeytraps, a Valuable Tool to Provide Effective Countermeasures 
for Crime against Computer and Network Systems,” Proceedings of the 7th World Multi-conference 
on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, July 2003. 
[25] N. Provos, “A Virtual Honeypot Framework,” Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, 
August 2004. 
[26] http://www.xprobe2.org 
[27] http://www.nmap.org 
 
Authors 
Dr. Natarajan Meghanathan is an Assistant 
Professor of Computer 
Science at Jackson State 
University. He graduated with 
MS and PhD degrees in 
Computer Science from 
Auburn University and The 
University of Texas at Dallas 
in August 2002 and May 2005  
respectively. His research interests are: Ad hoc 
Networks, Network Security and Graph Theory. 
He has received grants from NSF and ARL.  
 
Mr. Sumanth Reddy Allam 
was a graduate student in 
Computer Science at Jackson 
State University. He 
graduated with MS degree in 
May 2008.  
Dr. Loretta A. Moore is the Professor and Chair 
of the Department of 
Computer Science at 
Jackson State University, 
Jackson, MS. She 
graduated with MS and 
PhD Degrees in 
Computer Science from 
the Illinois Institute of 
Technology in 1986 and  
1991 respectively. Her research interests are: 
Intelligent Systems, Software Systems Design, 
Data and Information Management, Computer 
Security and Forensics. She has received grants 
from NSF, ARL and several other federal/state 
agencies. 
 
